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1 INTRODUCTION
The growing use of machine learning, and more specially, deep learning, in fields like computer vision and natural
language processing (NLP), has been accompanied by increased interest in the domain of adversarial learning, i.e.,
attacking and defending machine learning models algorithmically [55]. Of special interest are adversarial examples,
which are samples modified in order to be misclassified by the attacked classifier.
Most of the research in adversarial learning has focused on the computer vision domain, and more specially, in the
image recognition domain. This research has concentrated mainly on convolutional neural networks (CNNs), commonly
used in the computer vision domain [3, 94]. However, in recent years, adversarial example generation methods have
increasingly been utilized in other domains, including natural language processing (NLP; e.g., [37]). Some of these
attacks have also been used in the cyber security domain (e.g., [104]). This domain is particularly interesting, because it
is rife with adversaries, e.g., malware developers who want to evade machine and deep learning-based next generation
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anti-virus products, spam filters, etc.). Adversarial learning methods have already been executed against deep neural
networks based on static analysis features [1].
The main goal of this paper is to illuminate the risks posed by adversarial learning to cyber security solutions that
are based on machine learning techniques. This paper contains: (1) an in depth discussion about the unique challenges
of adversarial learning in the cyber security domain (Section 2), (2) an overview of the state-of-the-art adversarial
learning research papers in the cyber security domain, categorized by application (Section 5) and segmented according
to our unified taxonomy (defined in Section 4), (3) a discussion of the possible future research directions (Section 6),
including issues relating to existing defense methods (and the lack thereof), and (4) an introduction of the theoretical
background of the adversarial methods used in the cyber security domain (Section 3).
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
1. We focus on a wide range of adversarial learning applications in the cyber security domain (e.g., malware detection,
speaker recognition, cyber-physical systems, etc.), introduce a new, unified taxonomy and illustrate how existing
research fits into this taxonomy, providing a holistic overview of the field. In contrast, previous work focused mainly
on specific domains, e.g., malware detection or network intrusion detection.
2. Using our taxonomy, we highlight research gaps in the cyber security domain that have already been addressed in
other adversarial learning domains (e.g., Trojan neural networks in the image recognition domain) and discuss their
impact on current and future adversarial learning trends in the cyber security domain.
3. We discuss the unique challenges that attackers and defenders face in the cyber security domain, which don’t exist
in other domains (e.g., image recognition). For instance, in the cyber security domain the attacker must verify that the
original functionality of the malicious adversarial example remains intact. Our discussion addresses the fundamental
differences between adversarial attacks performed in the cyber security domain and those performed in other domains.
2 PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION: THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS IN THE
COMPUTER VISION AND CYBER SECURITY DOMAINS
Most published adversarial attacks, including those published at academic cyber security conferences, have focused
on the computer vision domain, e.g., generating an image of a cat that would be classified as a dog by the classifier.
However, the cyber security domain (e.g., for malware detection) seems a more relevant domain for adversarial attacks,
because in the computer vision domain, there is no concrete adversary (with a few exceptions, e.g., terrorists who want
to tamper with the pedestrian detection systems of autonomous cars, etc.). In contrast, in the cyber security domain,
there are actual adversaries with clear, targeted goals. Examples include ransomware developers who depend on the
ability of their ransomware to evade anti-malware products that would prevent both the ransomware’s execution and
the developers from collecting the ransom money, and other types of malware that need to steal user information
(e.g., keyloggers), spread across the network (worms), or perform any other malicious functionality while remaining
undetected.
A key step in defining an adversarial learning taxonomy suitable for the cyber security domain is answering the
question: Given the obvious relevance of the cyber security domain to adversarial attacks, why do most adversarial
learning researchers focus on computer vision? In addition to the fact that image recognition is a popular machine
learning research topic, another major reason that researchers focus on adversarial learning in the computer vision
domain rather than in the cyber security domain is that performing an end-to-end adversarial attack in the cyber security
domain is more difficult than performing such an attack in the computer vision domain (although it is non-trivial there
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too [35]). The differences between adversarial attacks performed in the two domains and the challenges that arise in
the cyber security domain are discussed in the subsections that follow.
2.1 There Is a Need to Keep The (Malicious) Functionality Intact in the Perturbed Sample
Any adversarial executable must preserve its malicious functionality after the sample’s modification. This is the main
difference between the image classification and malware detection domains and likely poses the greatest challenge. In
the image recognition domain, the adversary can change every pixel’s color (to a different valid color) without creating
an “invalid picture” as part of the attack. However, in the cyber security domain, modifying an API call or arbitrary
executable’s content byte value might cause the modified executable to perform a different functionality (e.g., modifying
a WriteFile() call to a ReadFile()) or even crash (if you change an arbitrary byte in an opcode to an invalid opcode that
would cause an exception). The same is true for network packets; perturbing a network packet in order to evade a
network intrusion detection system (NIDS) while maintaining a valid packet structure is challenging.
In order to address this challenge, adversaries in the cyber security domain must implement their own methods
(which are usually feature-specific) to modify features in a way that will not harm the functionality of the perturbed
sample, whether it is an executable, a network packet, or something else. For instance, the adversarial attack used in
Rosenberg et al. [104] generates a new malware PE with a modified API call trace in a functionality preserving manner.
2.2 There Are Many Feature Types
In the cyber security domain, classifiers usually use more than a single feature type as input (e.g., phishing detection
using both URL and connected server properties in Shirazi et al. [114]). Some feature types are easier to modify without
harming the executable’s functionality than others. For instance, in the adversarial attack used in Rosenberg et al. [104],
appending printable strings to the end of a malware PE file is much easier than adding API calls to the PE file using a
dedicated framework built for this purpose. In contrast, in an image adversarial attack, modifying each pixel has the
same level of difficulty. The implications of this issue are discussed in Section 6.5.1.
2.3 Small Perturbations Are Not Applicable for Discrete Features
In the computer vision domain, gradient-based adversarial attacks, e.g., the fast gradient sign method (FGSM) (Section
3), generate minimal random modification to the input image in the direction that would most significantly impact the
attacked classifier’s prediction. A ‘small modification’ (a.k.a. perturbation) can be, for example, changing a single pixel’s
color to a very similar color: we can change a single pixel’s color from brown to black to fool the image classifier.
However, this logic of ‘small perturbation’ cannot be applied to many cyber security features. Consider a dynamic
analysis classifier that uses API calls. An equivalent to changing a single pixel’s color would be to change a single API call
to another API call. Even if we disregard what such modification would do to the executable’s functionality (mentioned
in the previous subsection), would any of the following be considered a ‘small perturbation’ of the WriteFile() API call:
(1) modifying it to a ReadFile() (a different operation for the same type of media) or (2) modifying it to RegSetValueEx() (a
similar operation for a different type of media)? The use of discrete features (e.g., API calls) which are not continuous or
ordinal severely limits the use of gradient-based attack methods (Section 3). The implications of this issue are discussed
in Section 6.5.1.
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2.4 Executables Are More Complex Than Images
An image used as input to an image classifier (usually a convolutional neural network, CNN) is represented as a fixed
size matrix of pixel colors. If the actual image has different dimensions than the input matrix, the picture will usually be
resized, clipped, or padded to fit the dimension limits.
An executable, on the other hand, has a variable length: executables can range in size from several kilobytes to
several gigabytes. It is also unreasonable to expect a clipped executable to keep its original classification. Let’s assume
we have a 100MB benign executable into which we inject a shellcode at a function near the end of the file. If the
shellcode is clipped in order to fit the malware classifier’s dimensions, there is no reason that the file would be classified
as malicious, because its benign variant would be clipped to the exact same input.
In addition, the execution path of an executable may depend on the input, and thus, the adversarial perturbation
should support any possible input that malware may encounter when executed in the target machine.
While this is a challenge for malware classifier implementation, it also affects adversarial attacks against malware
classifiers. Attacks in which you have a fixed input dimension, (e.g., a 28*28 matrix for MNIST images) are much easier
to implement than attacks for which you need to consider the variable file size.
3 ADVERSARIAL LEARNING METHODS USED IN THE CYBER SECURITY DOMAIN
This section includes an overview of adversarial learning methods used in the cyber security domain which are inspired
by attacks from other domains. Due to space limitations, this is not a complete list of the state-of-the-art prior work in
other domains, such as image recognition or NLP. Only methods that have been used in the cyber security domain are
specified. More comprehensive overviews relevant to other domains can be found, e.g., in Qiu et al. [94].
In [125] and [16], the search for adversarial examples is formalized as a similar minimization problem:
argr min f (x + r ) , f (x) s .t . x + r ∈ D (1)
The input x , correctly classified by the classifier f , is perturbed with r , such that the resulting adversarial example
x + r remains in the input domain D but is assigned a different label than x . To solve Equation 1, the constraint
f (x + r ) , f (x) should be transformed into an optimizable formulation. Then, the Lagrange multiplier can be used to
solve it. To do this, we define a loss function Loss() to quantify this constraint. This loss function can be the same as the
training loss, or different, e.g., hinge loss or cross-entropy loss. Each of the various methods in the subsections that
follow attempt to solve Equation 1 in a different way, based on different knowledge that the attacker have about the
attacked classifier.
Gradient-Based Attacks
In gradient-based attacks, adversarial perturbations are generated in the direction of the gradient, i.e., in the direction
with the maximum effect on the classifier’s output (e.g., FGSM; Equation 4). Gradient-based attacks are effective but
require adversarial knowledge about the targeted classifier’s gradients. Such attacks also require knowledge about the
architecture of the attacked classifier and are therefore white-box attacks.
When dealing with malware classification tasks, differentiating between malicious (f (x) = 1) and benign (f (x) = −1),
as done by SVM, Biggio et al. [16] suggested solving Equation 1 using gradient ascent. To minimize the size of the
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perturbation and maximize the adversarial effect, the white-box perturbation should follow the gradient direction (i.e.,
the direction providing the greatest increase in confidence score from one label to another). Therefore, the perturbation
r in each iteration is calculated as:
r = ϵ∇x Lossf (x + r ,−1) s .t . f (x) = 1, (2)
where ϵ is a parameter controlling the magnitude of the perturbation introduced. By varying ϵ , this method can find an
adversarial sample x + r .
Szegedy et al. [125] views the (white-box) adversarial problem as a constrained optimization problem, i.e., find a
minimum perturbation in the restricted sample space. The perturbation is obtained by using box-constrained L-BFGS to
solve the following equation, where d is a term added for the Lagrange multiplier:
argr min(d ∗ |r | + Lossf (x + r , l)) s .t . x + r ∈ D, (3)
Goodfellow et al. [43] introduced the white-box fast gradient sign method (FGSM). This method optimizes the L∞
norm (i.e., reduces the maximum perturbation on any input feature) by taking a single step to each element of r in the
direction opposite the gradient. The intuition behind this attack is to linearize the cost function Loss() used to train a
model f around the neighborhood of the training point x with a label l that the adversary wants to misclassify. Under
this approximation:
r = ϵsiдn(∇x Lossf (x , l)). (4)
Kurakin et al. [70] extended research in this area, proposing the iterative gradient sign method (iGSM). As its name
suggests, this method applies FGSM iteratively and clips pixel values of intermediate results after each step to ensure
that they are close to the original image (the initial adversarial example is the original input):
x ′n+1 = Clip
{
x ′n + ϵsiдn(∇x Lossf (x ′n , l))
}
. (5)
The white-box Jacobian-based saliency map approach (JSMA) was introduced by Papernot et al. [87]. This method
minimizes the L0 norm by iteratively perturbing features of the input which have large adversarial saliency scores.
Intuitively, this score reflects the adversarial goal of moving a sample away from its source class towards a chosen
target class.
First, the adversary computes the Jacobian of the model:
[
∂fj
∂xi
(x)
]
i, j
where component (i, j) is the derivative of class
j with respect to input feature i . To compute the adversarial saliency map, the adversary then computes the following
for each input feature i:
S(x , t)[i] =

0 i f ∂ft (x )∂xi < 0 or
∑
j,t
∂fj (x )
∂xi
> 0
∂ft (x )
∂xi
|
∑
j,t
∂fj (x )
∂xi
| otherwise
, (6)
where t is the target class that the adversary wants the machine learning model to assign. The adversary then
selects the input feature i with the highest saliency score S(x , t)[i] and increases its value. This process is repeated until
misclassification of the target class is achieved or the maximum number of perturbed features has been reached. This
attack creates smaller perturbations with a higher computing cost than [43].
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The Carlini-Wagner (C&W) attack [22] formulates the generation of adversarial examples as an optimization problem:
find some small change r that can be made to an input x + r that will change its classification, such that the result is
still in the valid range. They instantiate the distance metric with an Lp norm (e.g., can either minimize the L2, L0, or L1
distance metric), define the cost function Loss() such that Loss(x + r ) ≥ 0 if and only if the model correctly classifies
x + r (i.e., gives it the same label that it gives x ), and minimize the sum with a trade-off constant c which is chosen by
modified binary search:
argr min
(
| |r | |p + c ∗ Lossf (x + r , t)
)
s .t . x + r ∈ D, (7)
where the cost function Loss() maximizes the difference between the target class probability and the class with the
highest probability. It is defined as:
max
(
argi,t max(f (x + r , i)) − f (x + r , t),−k
)
, (8)
where k is a constant to control the confidence.
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [82] proposed the DeepFool adversarial method to find the shortest distance from the original
input to the decision boundary of adversarial examples. DeepFool is an untargeted attack technique optimized for the
L2 distance metric. An iterative attack by linear approximation is proposed in order to overcome the nonlinearity of a
high dimension. If f is a binary differentiable classier, an iterative method is used to approximate the perturbation by
considering that f is linearized around x + r in each iteration. The minimal perturbation is provided by:
argr min (| |r | |2) s .t . f (x + r ) + ∇x f (x + r )T ∗ r = 0. (9)
This result can be extended to a more general Lp norm, p ∈ [0,∞).
Madry et al. [79] proposed a projected gradient descent (PGD) based adversarial method to generate adversarial
examples with minimized empirical risk and the trade-off of a high perturbation cost. The model’s empirical risk
minimization (ERM) is defined as E(x ,y)∼D [Loss(x ,y,θ )], where x is the original sample, and y is the original label. By
modifying the ERM definition by allowing the adversary to perturb the input x by the scalar value S, ERM is represented
byminθ ρ(θ ) : ρ(θ ) = E(x ,y)∼D [maxδ ∈SLoss(x + r ,y,θ )], where ρ(θ ) denotes the objective function. Note that x + r is
updated in each iteration.
Chen et al. [23] presented the elastic net adversarial method (ENM). This method limits the total absolute perturbation
across the input space, i.e., the L1 norm. ENM produces adversarial examples by expanding an iterative L2 attack with
an L1 regularizer.
Papernot et al. [88] presented a white-box adversarial example attack against RNNs. The adversary iterates over the
words x[i] in the review and modifies the words as follows:
x[i] = argmin
z
| |siдn(x[i] − z) − siдn(Jf (x)[i, f (x)])| | s .t . z ∈ D, (10)
where f (x) is the original model label for x , and Jf (x)[i, j] = ∂fj∂xi (x). siдn(Jf (x)[i, f (x)]) provides the direction one
has to perturb each of the word embedding components in order to reduce the probability assigned to the current class
and thus change the class assigned to the sentence. However, the set of legitimate word embeddings is finite. Thus, one
cannot set the word embedding coordinates to any real value. Instead, one finds the word z in dictionary D such that the
sign of the difference between the embeddings of z and the original input word is closest to siдn(Jf (x)[i, f (x)]). This
Manuscript submitted to ACM
Adversarial Learning in the Cyber Security Domain 7
embedding takes the direction closest to the one indicated by the Jacobian as most impactful on the model’s prediction.
By iteratively applying this heuristic to a word sequence, an adversarial input sequence that will be misclassified by the
model is eventually found.
Score-Based Attacks
Score-based attacks are based on knowledge of the attacked classifier’s confidence score. Therefore, these are gray-box
attacks.
The zeroth-order optimization (ZOO) attack was presented in [24]. ZOO uses hinge loss in Equation 8:
max
(
argi,t max(log (f (x + r , i))) − log (f (x + r , t)) ,−k
)
. (11)
ZOO uses the symmetric difference quotient to estimate the gradient and Hessian:
∂ f (x)
∂xi
≈ f (x + h ∗ ei ) − f (x − h ∗ ei )2h (12)
∂2 f (x)
∂x2i
≈ f (x + h ∗ ei ) − 2f (x) + f (x − h ∗ ei )
h2
, (13)
where ei denotes the standard basis vector with the i-th component as one, and h is a small constant.
Using Equations 11 and 12, the attacked classifier’s gradient can be numerically derived from the confidence scores
of adjacent input points, and then a gradient-based attack is applied in the direction of maximum impact in order to
generate an adversarial example.
Decision-Based Attacks
Decision-based attacks only use the label predicted by the attacked classifier. Thus, these are black-box attacks.
Generative Adversarial Network (GAN). An adversary can try to generate adversarial examples based on a GAN,
a generative model introduced in [42] by Goodfellow et al. A GAN is designed to generate fake samples that cannot
be distinguished from the original samples. A GAN is composed of two components: a discriminator and a generator.
The generator is a generative neural network used to generate samples. The discriminator is a binary classifier used to
determine whether the generated samples are real or fake. The discriminator and generator are alternately trained so
that the generator can generate valid adversarial records. Assuming we have the original sample set x with distribution
pr and input noise variables z with distribution pz , G is a generative multilayer perception function with parameter
g that generates fake samples G(z), and D is a discriminative multilayer perception function with parameter d that
outputs D(x), which represents the probability that model D correctly distinguishes fake samples from the original
samples. D and G play the following two player minimax game with the value function V (G;D):
min
G
max
D
V (G,D) = E
X∼pr
[loд (D(X ))] + E
Z∼pz
[loд (1 − D(G(Z ))] . (14)
In this competing fashion, a GAN is capable of generating raw data samples that look close to the real data.
The Transferability Property. Many black-box attacks presented in this paper (e.g., [104, 115, 144]) rely on the concept
of adversarial example transferability presented in [125]: Adversarial examples crafted against one model are also likely
to be effective against other models. This transferability property holds even when the models are trained on different
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Fig. 1. Chronological overview of the taxonomy (attack phases are underlined; characteristics within are numbered)
datasets. This means that the adversary can train a surrogate model, which has decision boundaries similar to those of
the original model, and perform a white-box attack against it. Adversarial examples that successfully fool the surrogate
model would most likely fool the original model as well [86].
The transferability between DNNs and other models, such as decision tree and SVM models, was examined in [89].
A study of the transferability property using large models and a large-scale dataset, was conducted in [77], showing
that while transferable non-targeted adversarial examples are easy to find, targeted adversarial examples rarely transfer
with their target labels. However, for binary classifiers (commonly used in the cyber security domain), targeted and
non-targeted attacks are the same.
The reasons for the transferability are unknown, but a recent study [58] suggested that adversarial vulnerability is
not “necessarily tied to the standard training framework but is rather a property of the dataset (due to representation
learning of non-robust features)”; this also clarifies why transferability happens regardless of the classifier architecture.
This can also explain why transferability is applicable to training phase attacks (e.g., poisoning attacks) [83].
4 TAXONOMY
Adversarial learning in the cyber security domain is the modeling of non-stationary adversarial settings like spam
filtering or malware detection, where a malicious adversary can carefully manipulate (or perturb) the input data,
exploiting specific vulnerabilities of learning algorithms in order to compromise the (targeted) machine learning
system’s security.
A taxonomy for the adversarial domain in general exists (e.g., Barreno et al. [13]) and inspired our taxonomy. However,
the cyber security domain has a few unique challenges (described in the previous section), necessitating a dedicated
taxonomy to categorize the existing attacks. Therefore, our taxonomy contains several new parts, e.g., the attack’s
output, attack’s targeting, and perturbed features.
A chronological overview of our taxonomy is shown in Figure 1. The attacks are categorized based on seven distinct
attack characteristics, which are sorted by four chronological phases of the attack:
1) Threat Model - The attacker’s knowledge and capabilities, known prior to the attack. The threat model character-
istics include the training set access and attacker’s knowledge.
2) Attack Type - These characteristics are a part of the attack implementation. The attack type characteristics includes
the attacker’s goals, the targeted phase, and the attack’s targeting.
3) The features modified (or perturbed) in the attack.
4) The attack’s output.
A detailed overview of our taxonomy, including possible values for the seven characteristics, is shown in Figure 2.
The seven attack characteristics are described in the subsections that follow.
We include these characteristics in our taxonomy because they posses the following attributes:
1) The characteristics are specific to the cyber domain (e.g., the perturbed features and attack’s output characteristics).
Manuscript submitted to ACM
Adversarial Learning in the Cyber Security Domain 9
Fig. 2. Detailed overview of the taxonomy
2) The characteristics are particularly relevant to the threat model, which plays a much more critical role in the
cyber security domain where white-box attack are less valuable than in other domains; this is the case, because in the
cyber security domain, the knowledge of adversaries about the classifier’s architecture is usually very limited (e.g., the
attacker’s knowledge, attacker’s training set access, and targeted phase characteristics).
3) The characteristics highlight research which exists in other domains of adversarial learning which is missing in
the cyber security domain (e.g., the attack’s targeting characteristic). We discuss these gaps in Section 6.
4) The characteristics exist in many domains but are more important in the cyber security domain. For instance,
availability attacks (which is part of the attacker’s goal characteristic) are of limited use in other domains, but are very
relevant in the cyber security domain.
4.1 Attacker’s Goals
This attack characteristic is sometimes considered part of the attack type (see Section4). An attacker aims to achieve
one or more of the following goals (a.k.a. the CIA triad): (1) Confidentiality - Acquire private information by querying
the machine learning system, e.g., reverse engineering the classifier’s model [129], (2) Integrity - Cause the machine
learning system to perform incorrectly for some or all input. For example, to cause a machine learning-based malware
classifier to misclassify a malware sample as benign [119], and (3) Availability - Cause a machine learning system to
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become unavailable or block regular use of the system. For instance, to generate malicious sessions which have many of
the features of regular traffic, causing the system to classify legitimate traffic sessions as malicious and block legitimate
traffic [28].
4.2 Attacker’s Knowledge
This attack characteristic is sometimes considered part of the threat model. Attacks vary based on the amount of
knowledge the adversary has about the classifier he/she is trying to subvert: (1) Black-box attack - Requires no knowledge
about the model beyond the ability to query it as a black-box (a.k.a. the oracle model), i.e., providing input and obtaining
the output classification, (2) Gray-box attack - Requires some (limited) degree of knowledge about the targeted classifier.
Usually this knowledge consists of the features monitored by the classifier, but sometimes it is other incomplete pieces
of information, like the output of the hidden layers of the classifier or the confidence score (and not just the class label)
provided by the classifier, (3) White-box attack - The adversary has knowledge about the model architecture and even
the hyperparameters used to train the model, and (4) Transparent-box attack - In this case, the adversary has complete
knowledge about the system, including both white-box knowledge and knowledge about the defense methods used by
the defender (see Section 6.5). Such knowledge can assist the attacker in choosing an adaptive attack that would bypass
the specific defense mechanism (e.g., Tramer et al. [128]).
While white-box attacks tend to be more efficient than black-box attacks (sometimes by an order of magnitude [100]),
the required knowledge is rarely available in real-world use cases. However, white-box knowledge can be gained either
through internal knowledge or using a staged attack to reverse engineer the model beforehand [129]. Each of the attacks
(black-box, gray-box, etc.) has a query-limited variant in which the adversary has only a limited number of queries
(in each query the adversary inserts input to the classifier and obtains its classification label), and not an unlimited
amount of queries, as in the variants mentioned above. A query-limited variant is relevant in the cases of cloud security
services (e.g., [102]). In such a service, the attacker pays for every query of the target classifier and therefore aims to
minimize the number of queries made to the cloud service when performing an attack. Another reason for minimizing
the number of queries is that many queries from the same computer might arouse suspicion of an adversarial attack
attempt, causing the cloud service to stop responding to those queries. Such cases require query-efficient attacks.
4.3 Attacker’s Training Set Access
Another important characteristic of an attack, sometimes considered part of the threat model, is the access the adversary
has to the training set used by the classifier (as opposed to access to the model itself, mentioned in the previous
subsection): (1) None - no access to the training set, (2) Read data from the training set (entirely or partially), (3) Add
new samples to the training set, and (4)Modify existing samples (the ability to modify either all features or only specific
features, e.g., the label). For instance, poisoning attacks require add or modify permissions.
4.4 Targeted Phase
This attack characteristic is sometimes considered part of the attack’s type. Adversarial attacks against machine learning
systems occur in two main phases of the machine learning process: (1) Training phase attack - This attack aims to
introduce vulnerabilities (to be exploited in the classification phase) by manipulating training data during the training
phase. For instance, a poisoning attack can be performed by inserting crafted malicious samples labeled as benign to the
training set as part of the baseline training phase of a classifier, (2) Inference phase attack - This attack aims to find and
subsequently exploit vulnerabilities in the classification phase. In this phase, the attacker only modifies samples from
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the test set. For example, an evasion attack involves modifying the analyzed malicious sample’s features in order to
evade detection by the model. Such inputs are called adversarial examples.
Note that attacks on online learning systems (for instance, anomaly detection systems [30]) combine both training
phase and inference phase attacks: the attack is an evasion attack, but if it succeeds, the classifier learns that this traffic
is legitimate, making such attacks harder for the system to detect in the future (i.e., there is a poisoning effect). Such
attacks would be termed inference attacks in this paper, since in this case, the poisoning aspect is usually a by-product
and is not the attacker’s main goal. Moreover, even if the poisoning aspect is important to the attacker, it would usually
be successful only if the evasion attack works, so evasion is the primary goal of the attacker in any case.
4.5 Attack’s Targeting
This characteristic is sometimes considered a part of the attack’s type. Each attack has a different target, defining
the trigger conditions or the desired effect on the classifier: (1) Label-indiscriminate attack - Always minimizes the
probability of correctly classifying a perturbed sample (the adversarial example), (2) Label-targeted attack - Always
maximizes the probability of a specific class to be predicted for the adversarial example (different from the predicted
class for the unperturbed sample), and (3) Feature-targeted attack - The malicious behavior of these attacks are only
activated by inputs containing an attack trigger, which might be the existence of a specific input feature or group of
features’ values in the adversarial example.
Attacks can be both feature and label-targeted. Note that in the cyber security domain, many classifiers are binary
(i.e., they have two output classes: malicious and benign, spam and ham, anomalous or not, etc.). For binary classifiers,
label-indiscriminate and label-targeted attacks are the same, because in these cases, minimizing the probability of the
current class (label-indiscriminate attack) is equivalent to maximizing the probability of the only other possible class.
4.6 Perturbed Features
As mentioned in Section 2.2, in the cyber security domain classifiers and other machine learning systems often use
more than one feature type. Thus, attackers who want to subvert those systems should consider modifying more than a
single feature type. We can therefore characterize the different adversarial attacks in the cyber security domain by the
features being modified/perturbed or added. Note that the same feature type might be modified differently depending on
the sample format. For instance, modifying a printable string inside a PE file might be more challenging than modifying
a word within the content of an email content, although the feature type is the same. Thus, this classification is not
simply a feature type, but a tuple of feature type and sample format, for instance: printable strings inside a PE file. The
following is a non-exclusive list (Rosenberg et al. [101] alone contains 2381 features, so the full list cannot be provided
here) of such tuples used in the papers reviewed in our research: PCAP (network session) statistical features (e.g.,
number of SYN requests in a certain time window), PCAP header (e.g., IP or UDP) fields, PE header fields, printable
strings inside a PE file, binary bytes inside a PE file, PE executed API calls (during a dynamic analysis of the PE file),
words inside an email or characters inside a URL.
4.7 Attack’s Output
As discussed in Section 2.1, and in contrast to image-based attacks, most adversarial attacks in the cyber domain require
the modification of a feature’s values. While in some domains, such as spam detection, modifying a word in an email is
non-destructive, modifying, e.g., a field in a PE header metadata might cause an unrunnable PE file. Thus, there are
two type of attacks: (1) Feature-vector attack - Such attacks obtain a feature vector as an input and output a perturbed
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feature vector. However, such an attack doesn’t generate a sample which can be used by the attacker and is usually only
a hypothetical attack, and (2) End-to-end attack - This attack generates a functional sample as an output. Thus, this is a
concrete real-life attack. Such attacks were reviewed in Pierazzi et al. [92]. This category is further divided into many
subgroups based on the sample type produced, e.g., a valid and runnable PE file, a phishing URL, a spam email, etc.
For instance, most traffic anomaly detection attacks reviewed in this paper are feature vector attacks. They use
statistical features which aggregate packet metadata, but don’t demonstrate how to generate the perturbed packet. In
contrast, the attack used by Rosenberg et al. [104], in which API calls are added to a malicious process, uses a custom
framework that generates a new binary that adds those API calls; thus, the attack in [104] is an end-to-end attack. In
some image-based domains, e.g., face recognition systems (Section 5.6.1), end-to-end attacks can be further categorized
as those that generate images (e.g., [78]) and those that generate physical elements that can be used to generate multiple
relevant images (e.g., [113]).
5 CYBER APPLICATIONS OF ADVERSARIAL LEARNING METHODS
Our paper addresses adversarial attacks in the cyber security domain. An overview of this section is provided in Tables
1-6. The attacked classifier abbreviations are specified in Appendix A. The attack type includes the attacker’s goals,
the targeted phase, and the attack’s targeting characteristics. The threat model includes the attacker’s knowledge and
training set access characteristics. Unless otherwise mentioned, a gray-box attack requires knowledge of the attacked
classifier’s features; in addition, the attack’s targeting is label-indiscriminate, and the attacker’s training set access
is none. Some of the columns are not a part of our taxonomy (Section 4) but provide additional relevant information
helpful for understanding the attacks, such as the attacked classifiers.
Each of the following subsections represents a specific cyber security domain/application that uses adversarial
learning and discusses the adversarial learning methods used in this domain. Due to space limitations, this review paper
only covers the state of the art in the abovementioned areas and not all adversarial attacks, especially in large and
diverse domains, such as biometric or cyber-physical systems. The mathematical background for the deep learning
classifiers is provided in Appendix A, and the mathematical background for the commonly used adversarial learning
attacks in the cyber security domain is provided in Section 3.
Note that while the classifiers the attacker tries to subvert are mentioned briefly, in order to provide the context for
understanding the attack, a complete list of the state-of-the-art prior work is not shown due to space limits. A more
comprehensive list can be found, e.g., in Berman et al. [15]. Cases where an adversarial attack does not exist for a
specific application type are omitted. This paper also does not review adversarial attacks in non-cyber domains, such
as image recognition (with the exception of face recognition in Section 5.6.1, which is cyber related). It also does not
cover papers related to cyber security, but not to adversarial learning, such as the use of machine learning to bypass
CAPTCHA.
5.1 Malware Detection and Classification
Next generation anti-malware products, such as Cylance, CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, and Microsoft ATP use machine
and deep learning models instead of signatures and heuristics, allowing them to detect unseen and unsigned malware
but also leaving them open to attacks against such models.
Malware classifiers can either use static features gathered without running the code (e.g., n-gram byte sequences,
strings, or structural features of the inspected code) or dynamic features (e.g., CPU usage) collected during the inspected
code’s execution.
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While using static analysis provides a performance advantage, it has a major disadvantage: Since the code isn’t
executed, the analyzed code might not reveal its “true features.” For example, when looking for specific strings in the
file, one might not be able to catch polymorphic malware, in which those features are either encrypted or packed, and
decrypted only during runtime by a specific bootstrap code. Fileless attacks (code injection, process hollowing, etc.)
are also a problem for static analysis. Thus, dynamic features, extracted at runtime, can be used. The most prominent
dynamic features that can be collected during malware execution are the sequences of API calls ([62]), particularly those
made to the OS, which are termed system calls. Those system calls characterize the software behavior and are harder to
obfuscate during execution time without harming the functionality of the code. The machine learning techniques (and
thus the attacks on them) can be divided into two groups: traditional (or shallow) machine learning and deep learning
techniques. Table 1 summarizes the attacks in the malware detection subdomain.
5.1.1 Attacking Traditional (Shallow) Machine Learning Malware Classifiers. Srndić and Laskov [119] imple-
mented an inference integrity gray-box evasion attack against PDFrate, a random forest classifier used for the static
analysis of malicious PDF files, which utilizes PDF structural features, e.g., the number of embedded images or binary
streams within the PDF. The attack used either a mimicry attack in which features were added to the malicious PDF to
make it “feature-wise similar” to a benign sample or created an SVM representation of the classifier and subverted it
using a method that follows the gradient of the weighted sum of the classifier’s decision function and the estimated
density function of benign examples. This ensures that the final result lies close to the region populated by real
benign examples. The density function must be estimated beforehand, using the standard techniques of kernel density
estimation, and then the transferability property is used to attack the original PDFrate classifier using the same PDF
file. Li et al. [73] performed an inference integrity gray-box attack against the same classifier by using GAN-generated
feature vectors and transforming them back into PDF files.
Ming et al. [80] used an inference integrity replacement attack, replacing API calls with different functionality
preserving API subsequences (so gray-box knowledge about the monitored APIs is required) to modify the malware
code. They utilized a system call dependence graph (SCDG) with the graph edit distance and Jaccard index as clustering
parameters of different malware variants and used several SCDG transformations on their malware source code to
cause the malware to be misclassified. Their transformations can cause similar malware variants to be classified as a
different cluster, but the authors didn’t show that the attack can cause malware to be classified (or clustered) as a benign
program, which is usually the attacker’s main goal. Xu et al. [139] also implemented an inference integrity gray-box
attack against a SCDG-based APK malware classifier, using n-strongest nodes and FGSM (see Section 3) methods.
Suciu et al. [123] and Chen et al. [25] used a training integrity poisoning attack against a linear SVM classifier trained
on the Drebin dataset [9] for Android malware detection. This attack requires gray-box knowledge of the classifier’s
features and add training set access. The poisoning was done by adding static features (permissions, API calls, URL
requests) from the target to existing benign instances.
Munoz-Gonzalez et al. [83] used a training integrity poisoning attack of logistic regression, MLP, and ADALINE
classifiers for spam and ransomware detection, by using back-gradient optimization. This attack requires gray-box
knowledge of the classifier’s features and training set add and read access. A substitute model is built and poisoned,
and the poisoned samples are effective against the attacked classifier as well, due to the transferability property.
Dang et al. [31] utilized the rate of feature modifications from a malicious sample and a benign known sample as
the score and used a hill climbing approach to minimize this score, bypassing SVM and random forest PDF malware
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Table 1. Comparison of Adversarial Learning Approaches in Malware Detection
Citation Year Attacked
Classifier
Attack
Type
Attack’s
Output
Threat
Model
Perturbed Features
[73,
119]
2020 RF Inference
integrity
PDF file
(end-to-
end)
Gray-box Static structural PDF
features
[80] 2015 SCDG Inference
integrity
PE file (end-
to-end)
Gray-box Executed API calls
[123] 2018 SVM Training
integrity
Feature
vector
Gray-box;
add
training set
access
Static Android manifest
features
[31] 2017 SVM, RF. Inference
integrity
PDF file
(end-to-
end)
Query-
limited
gray-box
Static structural PDF
features
[6] 2018 GBDT Inference
integrity
PE file (end-
to-end)
Black-box Operations (e.g.,
packing) performed on
a PE file
[45] 2017 FC DNN Inference
integrity
Feature
vector
White-box Static Android manifest
features
[139] 2020 SCDG Inference
integrity
Feature
vector
Gray-box Static Android manifest
features
[63,
67]
2018 1D CNN Inference
integrity
PE file (end-
to-end)
White-box PE file’s raw bytes
[122] 2018 1D CNN Inference
integrity
PE file (end-
to-end)
Black-box PE file’s raw bytes
[101] 2020 GBDT, FC DNN Inference
integrity
PE file (end-
to-end)
Black-box PE header metadata
[52] 2017 RF, LR, DT, SVM,
MLP
Inference
integrity
Feature
vector
Gray-box API call unigrams
[140] 2016 SVM, RF, CNN Inference
integrity
PDF file
(end-to-
end)
Gray-box Static structural PDF
features
[76] 2019 FC DNN, LR, DT,
RF
Inference
integrity
Feature
vector
Gray-box Static Android manifest
features
[2] 2019 CNN Inference
integrity
Feature
vector
White-box CFG features
[51] 2017 LSTM Inference
integrity
Feature
vector
Gray-box Executed API calls
[104] 2018 LSTM, GRU, FC
DNN, 1D CNN,
RF, SVM, LR,
GBDT.
Inference
integrity
PE file (end-
to-end)
Gray-box Executed API calls,
printable strings
[102] 2018 LSTM, GRU, FC
DNN, 1D CNN,
RF, SVM, LR,
GBDT.
Inference
integrity
PE file (end-
to-end)
Query-
limited
gray-box
Executed API calls,
printable strings
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classifiers based on static features in a query-efficient manner. Thus, their inference integrity attack is a query-limited
gray-box attack.
In Anderson et al. [6], the features used by the gradient boosted decision tree classifier included PE header metadata,
section metadata, and import/export table metadata. In [6], an inference integrity black-box attack which trains a
reinforcement learning agent was presented. The agent is equipped with a set of operations (such as packing) that it
may perform on the PE file. The reward function was the evasion rate. Through a series of games played against the
attacked classifier, the agent learns which sequences of operations are likely to result in detection evasion for any given
malware sample. The perturbed samples that bypassed the classifier were uploaded to VirusTotal and scanned by 65
anti-malware products. Those samples were detected as malicious by 50% of anti-malware products that detected the
original, unperturbed samples. However, unlike other attacks, this attack’s effectiveness is less than 25% (as opposed to
90% for most other adversarial attacks), showing that work is still needed in order for this approach to be practical in
real-life use cases.
5.1.2 Attacking Deep Neural Network Malware Classifiers. Rosenberg et al. [101] used the same dataset and PE
structural features as [6] to train a substitute FC DNN model and used explainable machine learning algorithms (e.g.,
integrated gradients) to detect which of the 2400 features have high impact on the malware classification and can also
be modified without harming the executable’s functionality (e.g., file timestamp). These features were modified by
a gray-box inference integrity attack, and the mutated malware bypassed not only the substitute model but also the
target GBDT classifier, which used a different subset of samples and features.
Grosse et al. [45] presented a white-box inference integrity attack against an Android fully connected DNN malware
classifier. The static features used were from the AndroidManifest.xml file, including permissions, suspicious API calls,
activities, etc. The attack is a discrete FGSM (Section 3) variant, which is performed iteratively in two steps until a
benign classification is achieved: (1) Compute the gradient of the white-box model with respect to the binary feature
vector x . (2) Find the element in x whose modification from zero to one (i.e., only feature addition and not removal)
would cause the maximum change in the benign score and add this manifest feature to the adversarial example.
Kreuk et al. [67] implemented an inference integrity attack against MalConv, a 1D CNN, using the file’s raw byte
content as features (Raff et al. [96]). The additional bytes are selected by the FGSM method (see Section 3) and are
inserted between the file’s sections. Kolosnjaji et al. [63] implemented a similar attack and also analyzed the bytes
which are the most impactful features (and are therefore added by the attack), showing that a large portion of them
are part of the PE header metadata. Suciu et al. [122] transformed this white-box gradient-based attack to a black-box
decision-based attack by appending bytes from the beginning of benign files, especially from their PE headers, which,
as shown in [63], are prominent features.
Hu and Tan [52] perturbed static API call unigrams using a gray-box inference integrity attack. If n API types are
used, the feature vector dimension is n. A generative adversarial network (GAN; Appendix A) was trained, where the
discriminator simulates the malware classifier while the generator tries to generate adversarial samples that would
be classified as benign by the discriminator, which uses labels from the black-box model (a random forest, logistic
regression, decision tree, linear SVM, MLP, or an ensemble of all of these). However, this is a feature vector attack and
not an end-to-end attack: the way to generate an executable with the perturbed API call trace was not presented.
Xu et al. [140] generated adversarial examples that bypass PDF malware classifiers, by modifying static PDF features.
This was done using an inference integrity genetic algorithm (GA), where the fitness of the genetic variants is defined
in terms of the attacked classifier’s confidence score. The GA is computationally expensive and was evaluated against
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SVM, random forest, and CNN classifiers using static PDF structural features. This gray-box attack requires knowledge
of both the classifier’s features and the attacked classifier’s confidence score.
Liu et al. [76] used the same approach to bypass an Android malware detector for IoT devices. The bypassed fully
connected DNN, logistic regression, decision tree, and random forest classifiers were trained using the Drebin dataset.
Abusnaina et al. [2] trained an IoT malware detection CNN classifier using graph-based features (e.g., shortest path,
density, number of edges and nodes, etc.) from the control-flow graph (CFG) of the malware disassembly. They used
white-box attacks: C&W, DeepFool, FGSM, JSMA (see Section 3), the momentum iterative method (MIM), projected
gradient descent (PGD), and the virtual adversarial method (VAM). They also added their own attack, graph embedding,
and augmentation, which adds a CFG of a benign sample to the CFG of a malicious sample via source code concatenation.
Hu and Tan [51] proposed a gray-box inference integrity attack using an RNN GAN to generate invalid APIs and
inserted them into the original API sequences to bypass an LSTM classifier trained on the API call trace of the malware.
A substitute RNN is trained to fit the targeted RNN. Gumbel-Softmax, a one-hot continuous distribution estimator, was
used to smooth the API symbols and deliver gradient information between the generative RNN and the substitute RNN.
Null APIs were added, but while they were omitted to make the generated adversarial sequence shorter, they remained
in the gradient calculation of the loss function. This decreases the attack’s effectiveness, since the substitute model is
used to classify the Gumbel-Softmax output, including the null APIs’ estimated gradients, so it doesn’t simulate the
malware classifier exactly. The gray-box attack output is a feature vector of the API call sequence that might harm the
malware functionality (e.g., by inserting the ExitProcess() API call in the middle of the malware code).
Rosenberg et al. [104] presented a gray-box inference integrity attack that adds API calls to an API call trace used as
input to an RNN malware classifier in order to bypass a classifier trained on the API call trace of the malware. A GRU
substitute model was created and attacked, and the transferability property was used to attack the original classifier. The
authors extended their attack to hybrid classifiers, combining static and dynamic features and attacking each feature
type in turn. The target models were LSTM variants, GRUs, conventional RNNs, bidirectional and deep variants, and
non-RNN classifiers (including both feedforward networks, like fully connected DNNs and 1D CNNs, and traditional
machine learning classifiers, such as SVM, random forest, logistic regression, and gradient boosted decision tree). The
authors presented an end-to-end framework that creates a new malware executable without access to the malware
source code.
A subsequent work ([102]) presented two query-limited gray-box inference integrity attacks against the same
classifiers, based on benign perturbations generated using a GAN that was trained on benign samples. One of the
gray-box attack variants requires the adversary to know which API calls are being monitored, and the other also
requires the adversary to know the confidence score of the attacked classifier in order to operate an evolutionary
algorithm to optimize the perturbation search and reduce the number of queries used. This attack is generic for every
camouflaged malware and doesn’t require a per malware predeployment phase to generate the adversarial sequence
(either using a GAN, as in [51], or a substitute model, as in [104]). Moreover, the generation is done at runtime, making
it more generic and easier to deploy.
5.2 URL Detection
Every Web pages has an address which is termed a uniform resource locator (URL). A URL begins with the protocol
used to access the page. The fully qualified domain name (FQDN) identifies the server hosting the Web page. It consists
of a registered domain name (RDN) and a prefix referred to as a subdomain. An attacker can gain full control of the
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Table 2. Comparison of Adversarial Learning Approaches in URL Detection
Citation Year Attacked
Classifier
Attack
Type
Attack’s
Output
Threat
Model
Perturbed Features
[12] 2018 LSTM Inference
integrity
URL (end-
to-end)
Gray-box URL characters
[114] 2019 State-of-the-art
phishing
classifiers
Inference
integrity
Feature
vector
Gray-box All features used by the
classifiers
[4] 2020 RF, NN, DT, LR,
SVM
Inference
integrity
URL (end-
to-end)
Black-box URL characters
[7] 2016 RF Inference
integrity
URL (end-
to-end)
Black-box URL characters
[115] 2019 CNN, LSTM,
BLSTM
Inference
integrity
URL (end-
to-end)
Black-box URL characters
subdomains and can set them to any value. The RDN is constrained, since it has to be registered with a domain name
registrar. The URL may also have a path and query components which also can be changed by the phisher at will.
Consider this URL example: https://www.amazon.co.uk/ap/signin?encoding=UTF8.We can identify the following com-
ponents: protocol = https; FQDN=www.amazon.co.uk; RDN= amazon.co.uk; path and query = /ap/signin?encoding=UTF8.
Table 2 summarizes the attacks in the URL detection subdomain.
Since URLs can be quite long, URL shortening services have started to appear. In addition to shortening the URL,
these services also obfuscate them.
5.2.1 Phishing URL Detection. Phishing refers to the class of attacks where a victim is lured to a fake Web page
masquerading as a target website and is deceived into disclosing personal data or credentials. Phishing URLs seem like
legitimate URLs and redirect users to phishing web pages, which mimic the look and feel of the phishing web pages’
target websites (e.g., a bank website), in the hopes that the user will enter his/her personal information (e.g., password).
Bashen et al. [12] performed an inference integrity attack to evade a character-level LSTM-based phishing URL
classifier ([11]) by concatenating the effective URLs from historical attacks (thus, this is a gray-box attack). Then, from
this full text, sentences of a fixed length were created. An LSTM model used those sentences as a training set in order
to generate the next character. After the model generated a full prose text, it was divided by http structure delimiters to
produce a list of pseudo URLs. Each pseudo URL was assigned a compromised domain, such that the synthetic URLs
take the form: http://+compromised_domain+pseudo_URL.
Shirazi et al. [114] generated adversarial examples using all possible combinations of the values of the features (e.g.,
website reputation) used by state-of-the-art phishing classifiers, such as [131]. However, this attack requires knowledge
about the features being used by the classifier, making it a gray-box inference integrity attack.
Phishing URLs were generated by a text GAN in [5, 130], in order to augment the phishing URL classifier’s training
set and improve its accuracy. AlEroud and Karabatis [4] used the generated phishing URLs as adversarial examples in
an inference integrity attack, in order to bypass the attacked classifier.
5.2.2 Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) URL Detection. DGAs are commonly used malware tools that generate
large numbers of domain names that can be used for difficult to track communications with command and control
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servers operated by the attacker. The large number of varying domain names makes it difficult to block malicious
domains using standard techniques such as blacklisting or sinkholing. DGAs are used in a variety of cyber attacks,
including ransomware, spam campaigns, theft of personal data, and implementation of distributed denial-of-service
(DDoS) attacks. DGAs allow malware to generate any number of domain names daily, based on a seed that is shared by
the malware and the threat actor, allowing both to synchronize the generation of domain names.
Anderson et al. [7] performed an inference integrity black-box attack that used a GAN to produce domain names
that current DGA classifiers would have difficulty identifying. The generator was then used to create synthetic data on
which new models were trained. This is done by building a neural language architecture, a method of encoding language
in a numerical format, using LSTM layers to act as an autoencoder. This is then repurposed, such that the encoder
(which takes in domain names and outputs an embedding that converts a language into a numerical format) acts as the
discriminator, and the decoder (which takes in the embedding and outputs the domain name) acts as the generator.
Anderson et al. attacked a random forest classifier trained on features defined in [8, 107, 141, 142]. The features of the
random forest DGA classifier are unknown to the attacker. They include: length of domain name, entropy of character
distribution in the domain name, vowel to consonant ratio, Alexa top 1M n-gram frequency distribution co-occurrence
count, where n = 3, 4, or 5, n-gram normality score, and meaningful character ratio.
Sidi et al. [115] used a black-box inference integrity attack, training a substitute model to simulate the DGA classifier
on a list of publicly available DGA URLs. Then that attacker iterates over every character in the DGA URL. In each
iteration, the results of the feedforward pass of the substitute model are used to compute the loss with regard to the
benign class. The attacker performs a single backpropagation step on the loss in order to acquire the Jacobian-based
saliency map, which is a matrix that assigns every feature in the input URL a gradient value (JSMA; see Section 3).
Features (characters) with higher gradient values in the JSMA would have a more significant (salient) effect on the
misclassification of the input, and thus each character would be modified in turn, making the substitute model’s benign
score higher. Finally, URLs that evade detection by the substitute model would also evade detection by the target DGA
classifier, due to the transferability property (see Section 3).
5.3 Network Intrusion Detection
A network intrusion detection system (NIDS) is a security system commonly used to secure networks. An NIDS is a
device or software which monitors all traffic passing a strategic point for malicious activities. When such an activity is
detected, an alert is generated. Typically, an NIDS is deployed at a single point, for example, at the Internet gateway.
Table 3 summarizes the attacks in the network intrusion detection subdomain.
Clements et al. [30] conducted a white-box inference integrity attack against Kitsune [81], an ensemble of autoen-
coders for online network intrusion detection. Kitsune uses damped packet statistics which are fed into a feature mapper
that divides the features between the autoencoders, to ensure fast online training and prediction. The RMSE output of
each autoencoder is fed into another autoencoder that provides the final RMSE score used for anomaly detection. This
architecture can be executed on small, weak routers.
Clements et al. used four adversarial methods: FGSM, JSMA, C&W, and ENM (Section 3). The attacker uses the LP
distance on the feature space between the original input and the perturbed input as the distance metric. Minimizing the
L0 norm correlates to altering a small number of extracted features. This method has two main limitations: (1) The
threat model assumes that the attacker knows the attacked classifier’s features, architecture, and hyperparameters.
This makes this attack a white-box attack, rather than a black-box attack. This is a less realistic assumption in real-life
scenarios. (2) The modification is made at the feature level (i.e., modifying only the feature vector) and not at the
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Table 3. Comparison of Adversarial Learning Approaches in Network Intrusion Detection
Citation Year Attacked
Classifier
Attack
Type
Attack’s
Output
Threat
Model
Perturbed Features
[30] 2019 Autoencoders
Ensemble
Inference
integrity
Feature
vector
White-box Protocol statistical
features
[74] 2018 SVM, NB, MLP,
LR, DT, RF, KNN
Inference
integrity
Feature
vector
Gray-box Statistical and protocol
header features
[144] 2018 DNN Inference
integrity
Feature
vector
Gray-box Same as [74]
[98] 2017 DT, RF, SVM Inference
integrity
Feature
vector
Gray-box Same as [74]
[136] 2018 MLP Inference
integrity
Feature
vector
White-box Same as [74]
[135] 2018 MLP Inference
integrity
Feature
vector
White-box Same as [74]
[69] 2019 DAGMM, AE,
AnoGAN, ALAD,
DSVDD,
OC-SVM, IF
Inference
integrity
PCAP file
(end-to-
end)
Query-
limited
gray-box
Similar to [74], but
modifies only
non-impactful features
like send time
[56] 2019 FC DNN, SNN Inference
integrity
Feature
vector
Gray-box Statistical and protocol
header features
[54] 2019 MLP, CNN, LSTM Inference
integrity,
training
availabil-
ity
Feature
vector
White-box Features from SDN
messages
sample level (i.e., modifying the network stream). This means that there is no guarantee that those perturbations can be
performed without harming the malicious functionality of the network stream. The fact that some of the features are
statistical makes the switch from vector modification to sample modification even more difficult.
Lin et al. [74] generated adversarial examples using a GAN, called IDSGAN, in which the GAN’s discriminator
obtains the labels from the black-box attacked classifier. The adversarial examples are evaluated against several attacked
classifiers: SVM, Naive Bayes, MLP, logistic regression, decision tree, random forest, and k-nearest neighbors classifiers.
This attack assumes knowledge about the attacked classifier’s features, making it a gray-box inference integrity attack.
The features include individual TCP connection features (e.g., the protocol type), domain knowledge-based features
(e.g., a root shell was obtained), and statistical features of the network sessions (like the percentage of connections that
have SYN errors in a time window). All features are extracted from the network stream (the NSL-KDD dataset [127]).
This attack generates a statistical feature vector, but the authors don’t explain how to produce a real malicious network
stream that has those properties.
Yang et al. [144] trained a DNN model to classify malicious behavior in a network using the same features as [74],
achieving performance comparable to state-of-the-art NIDS classifiers; they then showed how to add small perturbations
to the original input to lead the model to misclassify malicious network packets as benign while maintaining the
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maliciousness of the packets, assuming an adversary without knowledge about the classifier’s architecture is attempting
to launch a black-box attack. Three different black-box attacks were attempted by the adversary: an attack based on
zeroth-order optimization (ZOO; see Section 3), an attack based on a GAN (similar to the one proposed by [74]), and an
attack on which a substitute model is trained and then a C&W attack (see Section 3) is performed against the substitute
model. The application of the generated adversarial example against the attacked classifier is successful due to the
transferability property (Section 3). This paper has the same limitations as [74]: this gray-box inference integrity attack
assumes knowledge about the attacked classifier’s features and also generates only the feature vectors and not the
samples themselves.
In their gray-box inference integrity attack, Rigaki and Elragal [98] used the NSL-KDD dataset. Both FGSM and
JSMA (Section 3) attacks were used to generate adversarial examples against an MLP substitute classifier, and the results
were evaluated against decision tree, random forest, and linear SVM classifiers. This paper has the same limitations as
[74]: this attack assumes knowledge about the attacked classifier’s features and also generates only the feature vectors
and not the samples themselves.
Warzynskiet et al. [136] performed a white-box inference integrity feature vector attack against an MLP classifier
trained on the NSL-KDD dataset. They used a white-box FGSM attack (see Section 3). Wang et al. [135] added three
more white-box attacks: JSMA, DeepFool, and C&W (see Section 3). The LP distance and perturbations are in the
feature space in both cases.
Kuppa et al. [69] proposed a query-limited gray-box inference integrity attack against deep unsupervised anomaly
detectors, which leverages a manifold approximation algorithm for query reduction and generates adversarial examples
using spherical local subspaces while limiting the input distortion and KL divergence. Seven state-of-the-art anomaly
detectors with different underlying architectures were evaluated: deep autoencoding Gaussian mixture model, autoen-
coder, AnoGAN, adversarially learned anomaly detection, deep support vector data description, one-class support vector
machines, and isolation forests (see Section 3). All classifiers were trained on the CSE-CIC-IDS2018 dataset and features
[112]. Unlike other papers mentioned in this section, the authors generated a full PCAP file (and not just feature vectors)
and modified only features that could be modified without harming the network stream (e.g., time-based features), so
they actually created adversarial samples and not just feature vectors. However, they did not run the modified stream in
order to verify that the malicious functionality indeed remained intact.
Ibitoye et al. [56] attacked a fully connected DNN and a self-normalizing neural network (an SNN is a DNN with a
SeLU activation layer; [61]) classifier trained on the BoT-IoT dataset and features [64], using FGSM (see Section 3), the
basic iteration method, and the PGD at the feature level. They showed that both classifiers were vulnerable although
SNN was more robust to adversarial examples.
Huang et al. [54] attacked port scanning detectors in a software-defined network (SDN). The detectors were MLP,
CNN, and LSTM classifiers trained on features extracted from Packet-In messages (used by port scanning tools like
Nmap in the SDN) and switch monitoring statistic messages (STATS). The white-box inference integrity attacks used
were FGSM and JSMA (see Section 3). The JSMA attack was also (successfully) conducted on regular traffic packets
(JSMA reverse) to create false negatives, creating noise and confusion in the network (a white-box training availability
attack).
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Table 4. Comparison of Adversarial Learning Approaches in Spam Filtering
Citation Year Attacked
Classifier
Attack
Type
Attack’s
Output
Threat
Model
Perturbed Features
[111] 2018 SVM, kNN, DT,
RF
Inference
integrity
and
confiden-
tiality
Feature
vector
Gray-box Email words or same as
[74]
[55,
84]
2011 Bayesian spam
filter
training
availabil-
ity
email (end-
to-end)
Gray-box Email words
[17] 2014 SVM and LR Inference
integrity
email (end-
to-end)
White-box Email words
[19] 2012 NB, SVM Inference
integrity
email (end-
to-end)
Gray-box Email words
[68] 2018 NB, LSTM, 1D
CNN
Inference
integrity
email (end-
to-end)
Gray-box Email words
[71] 2018 LSTM, 1D CNN Inference
integrity
email (end-
to-end)
Gray-box Email words
[83] 2017 LR, MLP Training
integrity
Feature
vector
Gray-box;
add and
read
training set
access
Email words
5.4 Spam Filtering
The purpose of a spam filter is to decide whether an incoming message is legitimate (i.e., ham) or unsolicited (i.e., spam).
Spam detectors were among the first applications to use machine learning in the cyber security domain and therefore
were the first to be attacked. Table 4 summarizes attacks in the spam filtering subdomain.
Huang et al. [55] attacked SpamBayes [99], which is a content-based statistical spam filter that classifies email using
token counts. SpamBayes computes a spam score for each token in the training corpus based on its occurrence in spam
and non-spam emails. The filter computes a message’s overall spam score based on the assumption that the token scores
are independent, and then it applies Fisher’s method for combining significance tests to determine whether the email’s
tokens are sufficiently indicative of one class or the other. The message score is compared against two thresholds to
select the label: spam, ham (i.e., non-spam), or unsure.
Huang et al. designed two types of training availability attacks. The first is an indiscriminate dictionary attack, in
which the attacker sends attack messages that contain a very large set of tokens—the attack’s dictionary. After training
on these attack messages, the victim’s spam filter will have a higher spam score for every token in the dictionary. As a
result, future legitimate email is more likely to be marked as spam, since it will contain many tokens from that lexicon.
The second attack is a targeted attack—the attacker has some knowledge of a specific legitimate email he/she targets to
be incorrectly filtered. Nelson et al. modeled this knowledge by letting the attacker know a certain fraction of tokens
from the target email, which are included in the attack message.
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Biggio et al. [17] evaluated the robustness of linear SVM and logistic regression classifiers to a white-box inference
integrity attack where the attacker adds the most impactful good words and found that while both classifiers have the
same accuracy for unperturbed samples, the logistic regression classifier outperforms the SVM classifier in robustness
to adversarial examples.
Brï¿œckner et al. [19] modeled the interaction between the defender and the attacker in the spam filtering domain as
a static game in which both players act simultaneously; i.e., without prior information about their opponent’s move.
When the optimization criterion of both players depends not only on their own action but also on their opponent’s
move, the concept of a player’s optimal action is no longer well-defined, and thus the cost functions of the learner (the
defender) and the data generator (the attacker) are not necessarily antagonistic. They identify the conditions under
which this prediction game has a unique Nash equilibrium and derive algorithms that find the equilibrial prediction
model. From this equation, they derived new equations for the Nash logistic regression and Nash SVM using custom
loss functions. The authors showed that both the attacker and the defender are better off using or attacking the Nash
classifiers.
Sethi and Kantardzic [111] trained several classifiers (linear SVM, k-nearest neighbors, SVMwith RBF kernel, decision
tree, and random forest) on several datasets, including the Spambase dataset for spam detection and KDD99 for network
intrusion detection. They presented a query-limited gray-box anchor point inference integrity attack which is effective
against all models and a gray-box inference integrity and confidentiality attack which is not query-limited.
Generalized attack methods, which are effective against several NLP classifiers, are a recent trend.
Kuleshov et al. [68] implemented such a generalized black-box inference integrity attack to evade NLP classifiers,
including spam filtering, fake news detection, and sentiment analysis. The greedy attack finds semantically similar
words (enumerating all possibilities to find words with a minimal distance and score difference from the original input)
and replacing them in sentences with a high language model score. Three classifiers were evaded: NB, LSTM, and a
word-level 1D CNN.
Lei et al. [71] did the same while using a joint sentence and word paraphrasing technique to maintain the original
semantics and syntax of the text. They attacked LSTM and a word-level 1D CNN trained on the same datasets used by
[68], providing a more effective attack for every dataset, including spam filtering.
This interesting approach of generalization can be extended in the future by applying other NLP-based attacks in the
domain of spam adversarial examples.
5.5 Cyber-Physical Systems and Industrial Control Systems
Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) and industrial control systems (ICSs) consist of hardware and software components that
control and monitor physical processes, e.g., critical infrastructure, including the electric power grid, transportation
networks, water networks, nuclear plants, and autonomous car driving. Table 5 summarizes the attacks in the malware
detection subdomain.
Specht et al. [118] trained a fully connected DNN on the SECOM dataset, recorded from a semi-conductor manufac-
turing process, which consists of 590 attributes collected from sensor signals and variables during manufacturing cycles.
Each sensor data entry is labeled as either a normal or anomalous production cycle. They used the FGSM white-box
inference integrity feature vector attack to camouflage abnormal/dangerous sensor data as normal.
Ghafouri et al. [40] conducted a gray-box inference integrity attack on a linear regression-based anomaly detector,
neural network regression anomaly detector, and an ensemble of both, using the TE-PCS dataset, which contains sensor
data describing two simultaneous gas-liquid exothermic reactions for producing two liquid products. There are safety
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Table 5. Comparison of Adversarial Learning Approaches in Cyber-Physical Systems
Citation Year Attacked
Classifier
Attack
Type
Attack’s
Output
Threat
Model
Perturbed Features
[118] 2018 FC DNN Inference
integrity
Feature
vector
White-box Sensor signals
[40] 2018 LR, DNN Inference
integrity
Feature
vector
Gray-box Sensor data
[29] 2018 RL Q-learning Inference
integrity
Feature
vector
White-box Ultrasonic collision
avoidance sensor data
[36] 2017 LSTM Inference
integrity
Feature
vector
Gray-box Sensor data
[34] 2019 Autoencoders Inference
integrity/
availabil-
ity
Feature
vector
Gray-box Sensor data
[143] 2019 RNN Inference
integrity
Feature
vector
White-box Continuous sensor data
[72] 2020 FC DNN Inference
integrity
Feature
vector
Gray-box Sensor data
constraints that must not be violated (e.g., safety limits for the pressure and temperature of the reactor), corresponding
to the data. For the linear regression-based anomaly detector, the problem of finding adversarial examples of sensor
data can be solved using a mixed integer linear programming (MILP) problem. In order to bypass the neural network
regression and ensemble, an iterative algorithm is used. It takes small steps in the direction of increasing objective
function. In each iteration, the algorithm linearizes all of the neural networks at their operating points and solves the
problem using MILP as before.
Clark et al. [29] used a Jaguar autonomous vehicle (JAV) to emulate the operation of an autonomous vehicle. The
driving and interaction with the JAV environment used the Q-learning reinforcement learning algorithm. JAV acts
as an autonomous delivery vehicle and transports deliveries from an origination point to a destination location. The
attacker’s goal is to cause the JAV to deviate from its learned route to an alternate location where it can be ambushed. A
white-box inference integrity attack was chosen with the goal of compromising the JAV’s reinforcement learning (RL)
policy and causing the deviation. The attack was conducted by inserting an adversarial data feed into the JAV via its
ultrasonic collision avoidance sensor.
Feng et al. [36] presented a gray-box inference integrity attack against an LSTM anomaly detector using a GAN
(see Appendix A) with a substitute model as a discriminator. Two use cases were evaluated: gas pipeline and water
treatment plant sensor data. Li et al. [72] presented a gray-box inference integrity attack against the same dataset but
used a constraint-based adversarial machine learning to adhere to the intrinsic constraints of the physical systems,
modeled by mathematical constraints derived from normal sensor data.
Erba et al. [34] showed inference integrity and availability attacks against an autoencoder-based anomaly detection
of water treatment plant sensor data. Access to both the ICS features and benign sensor data (to train a substitute model)
is assumed, making this attack a gray-box attack. This attack enumerates all possible operations for every sensor.
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Yaghoubi et al. [143] presented a gray-box inference integrity attack against a steam condenser with an RNN-based
anomaly detector of continuous (e.g., signal) data. The attack uses gradient-based local search with either uniform
random sampling or simulated annealing optimization to find the data to modify.
5.6 Biometric Systems
In this subsection, we focus on the most commonly used biometric systems that leverage machine learning: face,
speech, and iris. Many studies have focused on adversarial attacks against other types of biometric systems, for
instance: handwritten signature verification [47], EEG biometrics [85], and gait biometric recognition [93]). However,
as previously mentioned, these are not discussed here due to space limitations. Table 6 summarizes the attacks in the
malware detection subdomain.
5.6.1 Face Recognition. Sharif et al. [113] presented an inference integrity attack against face recognition systems.
The target classifier for the white-box attack was VGG-Face, a 39 layer CNN [90]. The attacked classifier for the
black-box attack was the Face++ cloud service. Instead of perturbing arbitrary pixels in the facial image, this attack only
perturbed the pixels of eyeglasses which were worn by the attacker, so the attacker could either be classified as another
person (label-target attack) or not be classified as him/herself (indiscriminate attack). Both attacks are feature-targeted.
Sharif et al. used a Commodity inkjet printer to print the front plane of the eyeglass frames on glossy paper, which the
authors then affixed to the actual eyeglass frames when physically performing attacks.
Chen et al. [26] and Liu et al. [78] used a black-box training integrity poisoning attack against face recognition
systems. The CNN attacked classifiers were VGG-Face [90] and DeepID [124]. Liu et al. used a non-physical image,
such as a square appearing in the picture, as the Trojan trigger in the picture to be labeled as a different person. In
[26], the poisoned facial images contained a physical accessory as the key; a photo of a person taken directly from the
camera can then become a backdoor when the physical accessory is worn. Thus, this is both a feature-targeted and
label-targeted attack. Both attacks require training set add access.
5.6.2 Speaker Verification/Recognition. Note that in this subsection, we only discuss speaker recognition and
verification system adversarial attacks.
Kreuk et al. [66] presented white-box inference integrity attacks on an LSTM/GRU classifier that was either trained
on the YOHO or NTIMIT datasets using two types of features: Mel-spectrum features and MFCCs. They also presented
two black-box inference integrity attacks, using the transferability property. In the first one, they generated adversarial
examples with a system trained on NTIMIT and performed the attack on a system that was trained on YOHO. In the
second one, they generated the adversarial examples with a system trained using Mel-spectrum features and performed
the attack on a system trained using MFCCs. All of the attacks used the FGSM attack, and the attack output was a
feature vector and not a complete audio sample.
Gong and Poellabauer [41] trained aWaveRNNmodel (a mixed CNN-LSTMmodel) on raw waveforms (the IEMOCAP
dataset’s utterances) for speaker recognition, as well as for emotion and gender recognition. They used a substitute
waveCNN model and performed a black-box inference integrity attack using FGSM on the raw waveforms, rather than
on the acoustic features, making this an end-to-end attack that does not require an audio reconstruction step.
Du et al. [32] used six state-of-the-art speech command recognition CNN models: VGG19, DenseNet, ResNet18,
ResNeXt, WideResNet18, and DPN-92, all adapted to the raw waveform input. The models were trained for speaker
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Table 6. Comparison of Adversarial Learning Approaches in Biometric Systems
Citation Year Attacked
Classifier
Biometric Application Attack
Type
Attack’s
Output
Threat
Model
Perturbed Features
[113] 2016 CNN Face recognition Inference
integrity
Physical
eyeglasses
(end-to-
end)
Feature-
targeted
White-box
and
Black-box
Image’s pixels
[78] 2018 CNN Face recognition Training
integrity
Image (non-
physical
end-to-
end)
Feature-
targeted
White-box;
add
training set
access
Image’s pixels
[26] 2017 CNN Face recognition Training
integrity
Physical
accessory
(end-to-
end)
Feature-
targeted
White-box;
add
training set
access
Image’s pixels
[66] 2018 LSTM/GRU Speaker recognition Inference
integrity
Feature
vector
White-box
or
Black-box
Mel-spectrum features
and MFCCs
[41] 2017 Mixed
CNN-LSTM
Speaker recognition Inference
integrity
Raw
waveform
(end-to-
end)
Black-box Raw wave-forms
[32] 2019 CNN Speaker recognition Inference
integrity
Raw
waveform
(end-to-
end)
Black-box Raw wave-forms
[20] 2018 CNN Speaker recognition Inference
integrity
Feature
vector
Gray-box Mel-spectrum features
[134] 2018 CNN Face recognition, iris
recognition
Inference
integrity
Image (non-
physical
end-to-
end)
Gray-box Image’s pixels
[126] 2019 CNN Fingerprint
recognition, iris
recognition
Inference
integrity
Image (non-
physical
end-to-
end)
White-box Image’s pixels
[116,
117]
2019 CNN Iris recognition Inference
integrity
Feature
vector
Gray-box Iris codes
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recognition on the IEMOCAP dataset and for speech recognition, sound event classification, and music genre classifica-
tion using different datasets. The black-box inference integrity attack used FGSM or particle swarm optimization (PSO)
on the raw waveforms.
Cai et al. [20] trained a CNN classifier that performs multi-speaker classification using Mel-spectrograms as input.
They used aWasserstein GAN with gradient penalty (WGAN-GP) to generate adversarial examples for an indiscriminate
gray-box inference integrity attack and also used a WGAN-GP with a modified objective function for a specific speaker
for a targeted attack. The attack output is a feature vector of Mel-Spectrograms and not an audio sample.
5.6.3 Iris and Fingerprint Systems. Wang et al. [134] performed an indiscriminate black-box inference integrity
attack, leveraging the fact that many image-based models, including face recognition and iris recognition models, use
transfer learning, i.e., they add new layers on top of pretrained layers which are trained on a different model (a teacher
model, with a known architecture) and are used to extract high-level feature abstractions from the raw pixels. For
instance, the face recognition model’s teacher model can be VGG-Face [90], while an iris model’s teacher model is
VGG16. By attacking the teacher model using white-box attacks, such as C&W, the target model (student model), for
which the architecture is unknown, is also affected.
Taheri et al. [126] trained a CNN classifier on the CASIA dataset of images of iris and fingerprint data. They
implemented a white-box inference integrity attack using the FGSM, JSMA, DeepFool, C&W, and PGD methods to
generate the perturbed images.
Soleymani et al. [116, 117] generated adversarial examples for code-based iris recognition systems using a gray-box
inference integrity attack. However, conventional iris code generation algorithms are not differentiable with respect to
the input image. Generating adversarial examples requires backpropagation of the adversarial loss. Therefore, they used
a deep autoencoder substitute model to generate iris codes that were similar to iris codes generated by a conventional
algorithm (OSIRIS). This substitute model was used to generate the adversarial examples using FGSM, iterative gradient
sign method (iGSM), and DeepFool attacks.
6 CURRENT GAPS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS FOR ADVERSARIAL LEARNING IN THE
CYBER SECURITY DOMAIN
In this section, we highlight gaps in our taxonomy, presented in Section 4, which are not covered by the applications
presented in Section 5, despite having a required functionality. Each such gap is presented in a separate subsection
below. For each gap, we summarize the progress made on this topic in other domains of adversarial learning, such as
the computer vision domain, and from this, we extrapolate future trends in the cyber security domain.
6.1 Attack’s Targeting Gap: Feature-Targeted Attacks and Defenses
Poisoning integrity attacks place mislabeled training points in a region of the feature space far from the rest of the
training data. The learning algorithm labels such a region as desired, allowing for subsequent misclassifications at test
time. However, adding samples to the training set might cause misclassification of many samples and thus would arise
suspicion, while the adversary might want to evade a specific sample only (e.g., a dedicated APT).
In non-cyber domains, a feature-targeted attack, also known as a Trojan neural network attack (Liu et al. [78]) or
backdoor attack (Gu et al. [46], Chen et al. [26]) is a special form of poisoning attack, which aims to resolve this problem.
A model poisoned by a backdoor attack should still perform well on most inputs (including inputs that the end user may
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hold out as a validation set) but cause targeted misclassifications or degrade the accuracy of the model for inputs that
satisfy some secret, attacker-chosen property, which is referred to as the backdoor trigger. For instance, adding a small
rectangle to a picture would cause it to be classified with a specific target label [78]. Such attacks were performed on
face recognition [26, 78], traffic sign detection ([46], sentiment analysis, speech recognition, and autonomous driving
[78] datasets.
However, such attacks have not yet been applied in the cyber domain, despite the fact that such attacks have
interesting use cases. For instance, such an attack might allow only a specific nation-state APT to bypass the malware
classifier, while still detecting other malware, leaving the defender unaware of this feature-targeted attack.
Defenses against such attacks are also required. In the image recognition domain, Wang et al. [133] generated a
robust classifier by pruning out backdoor-related neurons from the original DNN. Gao et al. [38] detected a Trojan
attack during runtime by perturbing the input and observed the randomness of predicted classes for perturbed inputs
from a given deployed model. A low entropy in predicted classes implies the presence of a Trojaned input. Once
feature-targeted attacks are published in the cyber security domain, defense methods to mitigate them will likely follow.
6.2 Attacker’s Goals and Knowledge Gap: Confidentiality Attacks via Model Queries and Side
Channels
Reverse engineering (reversing) of traditional (non-ML based) anti-malware is a fundamental part of a malware
developer’s modus operandi. So far, confidentiality attacks have only been conducted against image recognition models
and not against, e.g., malware classifiers. However, performing such attacks in the cyber security domain might provide
the attacker with enough data to perform more effective white-box attacks, instead of black-box ones.
In the image recognition domain, confidentiality attacks have been conducted by querying the target model. Tramer
et al. [129] formed a query-efficient gray-box (the classifier type should be known) score-based attack. The attack
used equation solving to recover the model’s weights from sets of observed sample-confidence score pairs (x ,h(x)),
retrieved by querying the target model. For instance, a set of n such pairs is enough to retrieve the n weights of a
logistic regression classifier using n-dimensional input vectors. Wang et al. [132] used a similar approach to retrieve the
model’s hyperparameters (e.g., the factor of the regularization term in the loss function equation).
In non-cyber domains, confidentiality attacks have also been conducted via side-channel information. Duddu et
al. [33] used timing attack side channels to obtain neural network architecture information. Batina et al. [14] used
electromagnetic radiation to obtain neural network architecture information from embedded devices. Hua et al. [53]
used both a timing side channel and off-chip memory access attempts during inference to discover on-chip CNN model
architecture.
6.3 Perturbed Features Gap: Exploiting Vulnerabilities in Machine and Deep Learning Frameworks
In non-ML based cyber security solutions, vulnerabilities are commonly used to help attackers reach their goals (e.g., use
buffer overflows to run adversary-crafted code in a vulnerable process). A vulnerability in the underlying application or
operating system is a common attack vector for disabling or bypassing a security product. This trend is starting to be
seen in the adversarial learning domain. However, such attacks are not yet available against malware classifiers and are
only available against image classifiers. Such vulnerabilities are specialized and should be studied explicitly for the
proper cyber use cases in order to be properly exploited in theses cases.
In the image recognition domain, Xiao et al. [138] discovered security vulnerabilities in popular deep learning
frameworks (Caffe, TensorFlow, and Torch). Stevens et al. [120] did the same for OpenCV (a computer vision framework),
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scikit-learn (a machine learning framework), and in Malheur [97] (a dynamic analysis framework used to classify
unknown malware using a clustering algorithm). By exploiting these frameworks’ implementations, attackers can
launch denial-of-service attacks that crash or hang a deep learning application, or control-flow hijacking attacks that
lead to either system compromise or recognition evasions.
We believe that future adversarial attacks can view the deep learning framework used to train and run the model as
a new part of the attack surface, leveraging vulnerabilities in the framework, which can even be detected automatically
by a machine learning model (as reviewed in Ghaffarian et al. [39]). Some of those vulnerabilities can be used to add
data to input in a way that would cause the input to be misclassified, just as adversarial perturbation would, but by
subverting the framework instead of subverting the algorithm. This can be viewed as an extension of the perturbed
features attack characteristics in our taxonomy.
6.4 Attack’s Output Gap:End-to-End Attacks in Complex Format Subdomains
As discussed in Section 4.7, only end-to-end attacks can be used to attack systems in the cyber security domain. Some
subdomains, such as emails, have a simple format, and therefore it is easier to map from features (words) back to a
sample (email) and create an end-to-end attack. However, in more complex subdomains, such as NIDS and CPS, the
mapping from features to a full sample (e.g., a network stream) is complex. As can be seen in Sections 5.3 and 5.5, only
a small number of attacks in the NIDS and CPS subdomains (less than 10%) are end-to-end attacks.
We predict that like in the computer vision domain, where, after several years of feature vector attacks (e.g., [43]),
end-to-end attacks followed [35], the trend in the cyber security domain will be similar. Pierazzi et al. [92] formalized
initial theoretical constraints for end-to-end attacks. End-to-end attacks may follow three directions: 1) Adding new
features to an existing sample, e.g., [73, 92, 104, 119]. 2) Modifying only a subset of features that can be modified without
harming the functionality of an existing sample, e.g., [69, 101]. 3) Using cross-sample transformations (e.g., packing)
that would change many features simultaneously [6, 101].
6.5 Adversarial Defense Method Gaps
Our taxonomy is focused in the attack side, but every attack is accompanied by a corresponding defense method. The
lack of defense methods against adversarial attacks in the cyber security domain is acute, because this domain involves
actual adversaries: malware developers who want to evade next generation machine and deep learning-based classifiers.
Such attacks have already been executed in the wild against static analysis deep neural networks [1]. We mapped three
different gaps specific to the cyber security domain, which are described below.
6.5.1 Metrics to Measure the Robustness of Classifiers to Adversarial Examples. Several papers ([59, 91, 137])
suggested measuring the robustness of machine learning systems to adversarial attacks by approximating the lower
bound on the perturbation needed for any adversarial attack to succeed; the larger the perturbation, the more robust
the classifier. However, these papers assume that the robustness to adversarial attacks can be evaluated by the minimal
perturbation required to modify the classifier’s decision. This raises the question of whether this metric is valid in the
cyber security domain.
Section 2.3 leads us to the conclusion that minimal perturbation is not necessarily the right approach for adversarial
learning in the cyber security domain. As already mentioned in Biggio et al. [18], maximum confidence attacks, such as
the Carlini and Wagner (C&W) attack (Section 3), are more effective. However, this is not the complete picture.
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As mentioned in Section 2.2, in the cyber security domain classifiers usually use more than a single feature type as
input (e.g., both PE header metadata and byte entropy in Saxe et al. [106]). Certain feature types are easier to modify
without harming the executable’s functionality than others. On the other hand, an attacker can add as many strings
as needed; in contrast to images, adding more strings (i.e., a larger perturbation) is not more visible to the user than
adding less strings, since the executable file is still a binary file.
This means that we should not only take into account the impact of a feature on the prediction, but also the difficulty
of modifying the feature type. Unfortunately, there is currently no numeric metric to assess the difficulty of modifying
features. Currently, we must rely on the subjective opinion of experts who assess the difficulty of modifying each feature
type, as shown in Katzir and Elovici [60]. When such a metric becomes available, combining it with the maximum
impact metric would be a better optimization constraint than minimal perturbation.
In conclusion, both from an adversary’s perspective (when trying to decide which attack to use) and from the
defender’s perspective (when trying to decide which classifier would be the most robust to adversarial attack), the
metric of evaluation currently remains an open question in the cyber security domain.
6.5.2 Perturbed Features Gap: Defense Methods Designed for the Cyber Security Domain. If adversarial
attacks are equivalent to malware attacking a computer (machine learning model), then defense methods can be
viewed as an anti-malware product. However, most defense methods have been evaluated in the image recognition
domain for CNNs and in the NLP domain for RNNs. Due to space limitations, we cannot provide a complete list of the
state-of-the-art prior work in those domains. A more comprehensive list can be found, e.g., in Qiu et al. [94].
Several papers presenting attacks in the cyber security domain (e.g., [45, 115]) have sections showing that the attack
is effective even in the presence of well-known defense methods that were evaluated and found effective in the computer
vision domain (e.g., distillation and adversarial retraining). However, only a few defense methods were developed
specifically for the cyber security domain and its unique challenges, like those described in Section 2. Furthermore,
cyber security classifiers usually have a different architecture than computer vision classifiers, against which most
published defenses are evaluated.
Chen et al. [25] suggested a method to make an Android malware classifier robust to poisoning attacks. Their method
has two phases: an offline training phase that selects and extracts features from the training set and an online detection
phase that utilizes the classifier trained by the first phase. These two phases are intertwined through a self-adaptive
learning scheme, wherein an automated camouflage detector is introduced to filter the suspicious false negatives
and feed them back into the training phase. Stokes et al. [121] evaluated three defense methods: weight decay, an
ensemble of classifiers, and distillation for a dynamic analysis malware classifier based on a non-sequence based deep
neural network. Rosenberg et al. [103] tried to defend an API call-based RNN classifier and compared their own RNN
defense method, sequence squeezing, to five other defense methods inspired by existing CNN-based defense methods:
adversarial retraining, statistical anomalous subsequences, defense GAN, nearest neighbor classification, and RNN
ensembles. They showed that sequence squeezing provides the best trade-off between training and inference overhead
(which is less critical in the computer vision domain) and the adversarial robustness.
Specht et al. [118] suggested an iterative adversarial retraining process to mitigate adversarial examples for semi-
conductor anomaly detection of sensor data. Soleymani et al. [116] used wavelet domain denoising of the iris samples
by investigating each wavelet sub-band and removing the sub-bands that are most affected by the adversary.
Kravchic and Shabtai [65]suggested detecting anomalies and cyber attacks in ICS data using 1D CNNs and under-
complete autoencoders (UAEs).
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Ghafouri et al. [40] presented robust linear regression and neural network regression-based anomaly detectors for
CPS anomalous data detection by modeling a game between the defender and attacker as a Stackelberg game in which
the defender first commits to a collection of thresholds for the anomaly detectors, and the attacker then computes an
optimal attack. The defender aims to minimize the impact of attacks, subject to a constraint, typically set to achieve a
target number of false alarms without consideration of attacks.
Taheri et al. [126] presented an architecture that includes shallow and deep neural networks to defend against
biometric adversarial examples. The shallow neural network is responsible for data preprocessing and generating
adversarial samples. The deep neural network is responsible for understanding data and information, as well as detecting
adversarial samples. The deep neural network gets its weights from transfer learning, adversarial training, and noise
training.
In our opinion, additional defense methods proposed for the image recognition domain could inspire similar defense
methods in the cyber domain. Furthermore, in this domain further emphasis should be put on the defense method
overhead (as done, e.g., in [103]), due to the fact that malware classifiers perform their classification in real time, so
unlike in the image recognition domain, low overhead is critical.
6.5.3 Attacker’s Knowledge Gap: Defense Methods Robust to Unknown and Transparent-Box Adversarial
Attacks. There are two main challenges when developing a defense method:
The first challenge is creating a defense method which is also robust against transparent-box attacks, i.e., attackers
who know what defense methods are being used and select their attack methods accordingly.
In the computer vision domain, [21, 128] showed that many different types of commonly used defense methods (e.g.,
detection of adversarial examples using statistical irregularities) are rendered useless by a specific type of adversarial
attack. He et al. [49] showed the same for feature squeezing, and [10, 48, 57] presented similar results against Defense-
GAN.
Similar research should be conducted in the cyber security domain. For instance, attackers can make their attack
more robust against RNN subsequence model ensembles presented in [103] by adding perturbations across the entire
API call sequence and not just until the classification changes.
The second challenge is creating defense methods that are effective against all attacks and not just specific ones,
termed attack-agnostic defense methods in [103]. However, the challenge of finding a metric to evaluate the robustness
of classifiers to adversarial attacks in the cyber security domain, discussed in Section 6.5.1, makes the implementation
of attack-agnostic defense methods in the cyber security domain more challenging than in other domains.
7 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we reviewed the latest research in a wide range of adversarial learning applications in the cyber security
domain (e.g., malware detection, network intrusion detection, etc.).
One conclusion is that while feature vector adversarial attacks in the cyber security domain are possible, real-life
attacks (e.g., against next generation anti-virus software) are challenging. This is due to the unique challenges that
attackers and defenders are faced with in the cyber security domain: the difficulty of modifying samples end-to-end
without damaging the malicious business logic, the need to modify many feature types with various levels of modification
difficulty, etc.
From the gaps we highlighted in our taxonomy and the recent advancements in other domains of adversarial learning,
we identified some of the directions of future research in adversarial learning in the cyber security domain. One of
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these directions is the implementation of feature-triggered attacks that would work only if a certain trigger exists,
leaving the system’s integrity unharmed in other cases, thus making it harder to detect the attack. Another possible
direction is performing confidentiality attacks involving model reversing via queries or side channels. A third direction
is expanding the attack surface of adversarial attacks to include the vulnerabilities in the relevant machine learning
framework and designing machine learning models to detect and leverage them. From the defender’s point of view,
more robust defense methods against adversarial attacks in the cyber security domain would be the focus of future
research.
A final conclusion is that adversarial learning in the cyber security domain becomes more and more similar to the
cat and mouse game conducted in the traditional cyber security domain, in which attackers implement increasingly
sophisticated attacks to evade the defenders and vice versa. A key takeaway is that defenders should become more
proactive in assessing their system’s robustness to adversarial attacks, the same way penetration testing is used in the
traditional cyber security domain.
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APPENDIX A: DEEP LEARNING CLASSIFIERS: MATHEMATICAL AND TECHNICAL BACKGROUND
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs)
Neural networks are a class of machine learning models made up of layers of neurons (elementary computing units).
A neuron takes an n-dimensional feature vector x = [x1,x2...xn ] from the input or a lower level neuron and outputs
a numerical output y = [y1,y2...ym ], such that
yj = ϕ(
∑n
i=1w jixi + bj ) (15)
to the neurons in higher layers or the output layer. For the neuron j, yj is the output and bj is the bias term, while
w ji are the elements of a layer’s weight matrix. The function ϕ is the nonlinear activation function, such as siдmoid(),
which determines the neuron’s output. The activation function introduces nonlinearities to the neural network model.
Otherwise, the network remains a linear transformation of its input signals. Some of the success of DNNs is attributed
to these multi-layers of nonlinear correlations between features, which aren’t available in popular traditional machine
learning classifiers, such as SVM, which has at most a single nonlinear layer using the kernel trick.
A group ofm neurons forms a hidden layer which outputs a feature vector y. Each hidden layer takes the previous
layer’s output vector as the input feature vector and calculates a new feature vector for the layer above it:
yl = ϕ(W lyl−1 + bl ) (16)
where yl ,W l and bl are the output feature vector, weight matrix, and bias of the l-th layer, respectively. Proceeding
from the input layer, each subsequent higher hidden layer automatically learns a more complex and abstract feature
representation which captures a higher level structure.
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs). CNNs are a type of DNN. Let xi be the k-dimensional vector corresponding
to the i-th element in the sequence. A sequence of length n (padded when necessary) is represented as: x[0 : n − 1] =
x[0] ⊥ x[1] ⊥ x[n − 1], where ⊥ is the concatenation operator. In general, let x[i : i + j] refer to the concatenation of
words x[i],x[i + 1], ...,x[i + j]. A convolution operation involves a filterw , which is applied to a window of h elements
to produce a new feature. For example, a feature ci is generated from a window of words x[i : i + h − 1] by:
ci = ϕ(Wx[i : i + h] + b) (17)
where b is the bias term and ϕ is the activation function. This filter is applied to each possible window of elements in
the sequence {x[0 : h − 1],x[1 : h], ...,x[n − h : n − 1]} to produce a feature map: c = [c0, c1, ..., cn−h ]. We then apply
a max-over-time pooling operation over the feature map and take the maximum value: cˆ = max(c) as the feature
corresponding to this particular filter. The idea is to capture the most important feature (the one with the highest value)
for each feature map.
We described the process by which one feature is extracted from the filter above. The CNN model uses multiple
filters (with varying window sizes) to obtain multiple features. These features form the penultimate layer and are passed
to a fully connected softmax layer whose output is the probability distribution over labels.
CNNs have two main differences from fully connected DNNs:
(1) CNNs exploit spatial locality by enforcing a local connectivity pattern between neurons of adjacent layers. The
architecture thus ensures that the learned ”filters” produce the strongest response to a spatially local input
pattern. Stacking many such layers leads to nonlinear ”filters” that become increasingly ”global.” This allows the
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network to first create representations of small parts of the input and assemble representations of larger areas
from them.
(2) In CNNs, each filter is replicated across the entire input. These replicated units share the same parameterization
(weight, vector, and bias) and form a feature map. This means that all of the neurons in a given convolutional
layer respond to the same feature (within their specific response field). Replicating units in this way allows for
features to be detected regardless of their position in the input, thus constituting the property of translation
invariance. This property is important in both image problems and with sequence input, such as API call traces.
Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs)
A limitation of neural networks is that they accept a fixed sized vector as input (e.g., an image) and produce a fixed
sized vector as output (e.g., probabilities of different classes). Recurrent neural networks can use sequences of vectors
in the input, output, or both. In order to do that, the RNN has a hidden state vector, the context of the sequence, which
is combined with the current input to generate the RNN’s output.
Given an input sequence [x1,x2...xT ], the RNN computes the hidden vector sequence [h1,h2...hT ] and the output
vector sequence
[
y1,y2...yT
]
by iterating the following equations from t = 1 to T :
ht = ϕ(W xhxt +W hhxt−1 + bh ) (18)
yt =W hyht + bo (19)
where theW terms denote weight matrices (e.g.,W xh is the input hidden weight matrix), the b terms denote bias
vectors (e.g., bh is the hidden bias vector), and ϕ is usually an element-wise application of an activation function. DNNs
without a hidden state, as specified in Equation 18, reduce Equation 19 to the private case of Equation 16, known as
feedforward networks.
Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM). Standard RNNs suffer from both exploding and vanishing gradients. Both
problems are caused by the RNNs’ iterative nature, in which the gradient is essentially equal to the recurrent weight
matrix raised to a high power. These iterated matrix powers cause the gradient to grow or shrink at a rate that is
exponential in terms of the number of timesteps T . The vanishing gradient problem does not necessarily cause the
gradient to be small; the gradient’s components in directions that correspond to long-term dependencies might be
small, while the gradient’s components in directions that correspond to short-term dependencies is large. As a result,
RNNs can easily learn the short-term but not the long-term dependencies. For instance, a conventional RNN might
have problems predicting the last word in: “I grew up in France...I speak fluent French” if the gap between the sentences
is large.
The LSTM architecture ([50]), which uses purpose-built memory cells to store information, is better at finding and
exploiting long-range context than conventional RNNs. The LSTM’s main idea is that instead of computing ht from
ht−1 directly with a matrix-vector product followed by a nonlinear transformation (Equation 18), the LSTM directly
computes △ht , which is then added to ht−1 to obtain ht . This implies that the gradient of the long-term dependencies
cannot vanish.
Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU). Introduced in [27], the gated recurrent unit (GRU) is an architecture that is similar to
LSTM but reduces the gating signals from three (in the LSTM model: input, forget, and output) to two. The two gates
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are referred to as an update gate and a reset gate. Some research has shown that a GRU RNN is comparable to, or even
outperforms, an LSTM model in many cases, while requiring less training time.
Bidirectional Recurrent Neural Networks (BRNNs). One shortcoming of conventional RNNs is that they can only
make use of prior context. It is often the case that for malware events the most informative part of a sequence occurs at
the beginning of the sequence and may be forgotten by standard recurrent models. Bidirectional RNNs ([110]) overcome
this issue by processing the data in both directions with two separate hidden layers, which are then fed forward to
the same output layer. A BRNN computes the forward hidden sequence
−→
h t , the backward hidden sequence
←−
h t , and
the output sequence yt by iterating the backward layer from t = T to 1 and the forward layer from t = 1 to T , and
subsequently updating the output layer. Combining BRNNs with LSTM results in bidirectional LSTM ([44]), which can
access the long-range context in both input directions.
Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs)
A GAN is a combination of two deep neural networks: a classification network (the discriminator) which classifies
between real and fake inputs and a generative network (the generator) that tries to generate fake inputs that would
be misclassified as genuine by the discriminator [42], eventually reaching a Nash equilibrium. The end result is a
discriminator which is more robust against fake inputs.
GANs are only defined for real-valued data, while RNN classifiers use discrete symbols. The discrete outputs from the
generative model make it difficult to pass the gradient update from the discriminative model to the generative model.
Modeling the data generator as a stochastic policy in reinforcement learning can bypass the generator differentiation
problem [145].
Autoencoders (AEs)
Autoencoders are widely used for unsupervised learning tasks such as learning deep representations or dimensionality
reduction. Typically, a traditional deep autoencoder consists of two components, the encoder and the decoder. Let
us denote the encoder’s function as fθ : X → H and denote the decoder’s function as дω : H → X , where θ ,ω
are parameter sets for each function, X represents the data space, and H represents the feature (latent) space. The
reconstruction loss is:
L(θ ,ω) = 1
N
| |X − дω (fθ (X )) | |2 (20)
where L(θ ,ω) represents the loss function for the reconstruction.
Deep Autoencoding Gaussian Mixture Model (DAGMM)
The DAGMM [147] uses two different networks, a deep autoencoder and a Gaussian mixture model (GMM) based
estimator network, to determine whether a sample is anomalous or not.
AnoGAN
AnoGAN [108] is a GAN-based method for anomaly detection. This method involves training a DCGAN [95] and using
it to recover a latent representation for each test data sample at inference time. The anomaly score is a combination of
reconstruction and discrimination components.
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Adversarially Learned Anomaly Detection (ALAD)
ALAD [146] is based on a bidirectional GAN anomaly detector, which uses reconstruction errors from adversarially
learned features to determine if a data sample is anomalous. ALAD employs spectral normalization and additional
discriminators to improve the encoder and stabilize GAN training.
Deep Support Vector Data Description (DSVDD)
DSVDD [105] trains a deep neural network while optimizing a data-enclosing hypersphere in the output space.
One-Class Support Vector Machine (OC-SVM)
The OC-SVM [109] is a kernel-based method that learns a decision boundary around normal examples.
Isolation Forest (IF)
An isolation forest [75] is a partition-based method which isolates anomalies by building trees using randomly selected
split values.
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